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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from the district court's dismissal of Mr. Lynch's post-
conviction petition. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code § 78A-4-
103(2)(j). The trial court's summary judgment ruling and oral ruling are 
attached hereto as Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Issue 1: Did the trial court err when it held that Mr. Lynch was 
procedurally barred, under Utah Code § 78B-9-106(1)(b), from raising claims 
of ineffective assistance of counsel in his post-conviction petition? 
Standard of Review: A trial court's denial of post-conviction relief is 
reviewed for correctness. Taylor v. State, 2007 UT 12, 'II 13, 156 P.3d 739. 
Preservation: Mr. Lynch raised and preserved his ineffective assistance 
claims in his Second Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief ("Second 
Amended Petition"). R. 996-1008. 
Issue 2: Did the trial court err when it granted summary judgment on 
VI Mr. Lynch's remaining claims of ineffective assistance of counsel? 
Standard of Review: The Court "review[s] an appeal from an order 
dismissing or denying a petition for post-conviction relief for correctness 
without deference to the lower court's conclusions of law." Taylor v. State, 
2012 UT 5, 'II 8, 270 P.3d 471. 
Preservation: Mr. Lynch raised and preserved his claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel in his Second Amended Petition. R. 996-1008. 
Issue 3: Did the trial court err when it ruled that newly discovered 
'-' evidence did not entitle Mr. Lynch to post-conviction relief? 
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Standard of Review: The Court "review[s] an appeal from an order 
dismissing or denying a petition for post-conviction relief for correctness (r:.. 
without deference to the lower court's conclusions of law." Taylor v. State, 
2012 UT 5, 'II 8, 270 P.3d 471. 
Preservation: Mr. Lynch raised and preserved his claims regarding 
newly discovered evidence in his Second Amended Petition. R. 1008. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following constitutional provisions and statutes can be found in 
AddendumB. 
U.S. Const. amend. VI 
U.S. Const. amend. XIV (relevant portions) 
Utah Code§ 78B-9-104 
Utah Code§ 78B-9-106 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Statement of Facts 
On October 3, 2007, Patricia Rothermich ( the "victim") was struck by a 
vehicle from behind while taking an afternoon walk in Holladay, Utah. R. 58. 
The force of the impact catapulted her forward, causing her to slide 43 feet. 
R. 59. She suffered significant injuries to her head and calves. R. 49. Her left 
calf was split open by something on the front of the vehicle. R. 112. She died 
on the way to the hospital. State v. Lynch, 2011 UT App 1, <JI 2, 246 P.3d 525. 
No one saw what happened. R. 81 ("There were no eyewitnesses, no."), 
121. One man who was working nearby told the police he heard a ''loud 
noise," like a vehicle striking a pothole at a high rate of speed, and that, when 
he looked up, he saw a "large red truck driving by." R. 1083, 81, 84. 
2 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Three days after the incident, another woman reported a conversation 
she overheard in a Herriman grocery store, in which one man told another he 
had hit a woman with his car in Holladay and learned later that day she had 
died. R. 707. The woman reported that she saw the two men leave the store 
in a pearly white truck with damage to its hood and a partial license-plate 
listing of "758." R. 707. Lynch later learned that this woman's name was 
Michelle Ashe and that she had recorded the experience in her journal. R. 
216. 
The police declined to pursue these leads, instead focusing on a "white," 
''high-profile vehicle" like a "truck or a van," R. 57, claiming that that was 
where the evidence ''led" them. R. 82. Eventually, the investigation focused on 
a white truck (not the pearly white truck described above) owned by the 
victim's husband, Sherman Lynch. R. 1531-32. The discovery of Lynch's 
white truck was made possible through a tip from Lynch's then-girlfriend, 
Nancy Scott. R. 1531. Distressed at her discovery that Lynch was married, 
xi Scott reported to authorities that she helped Lynch buy a white truck at an 
auction. R. 1531-32. After additional investigation, the police found the white 
truck in an abandoned garage. R. 1532-33. 
With no eyewitnesses, the police set out to prove Lynch's involvement 
1n the victim's death by connecting Lynch's white truck to the auto-
pedestrian collision in Holladay. As relayed at trial, the prosecution 
attempted to link the truck with the death of the victim in a few different 
ways. First, Deputy Anderson attributed the victim's serious left calf injury 
to a "tow hook" located in the front of the white truck. R. 73-75. Second, 
Anderson noted at the preliminary hearing that marks on the victim's 
3 
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body-suggestive of a grill of some sort-measured three centimeters across. 
R. 162. ~ 
Third, Anderson testified that the exterior of the truck bore the ''kind of 
damage"-some dents in the hood-he would have expected to see given the 
nature of the collision. R. 70. Earlier in his testimony, however, Detective 
Anderson testified that he would have expected the vehicle involved to have 
incurred more serious damage, including the ''breaking of lamps or bending of 
materials, such as the hood or fenders," and the ''breaking of plastic pieces." 
R. 699. Other than the dents and the tow hook, however, Deputy Anderson 
testified at trial that he could not "see anything of value" in a picture of the 
front of the truck. R. 1213; cf. R. 1534 (referring to stipulated testimony at 
trial from the truck's prior owner, in which he testified that the only "new" 
damage to the truck was a missing antenna, a crack in the windshield, and • 
damage to the front of the hood). 
Similarly inconsistent on this point was the testimony of Deputy 
Anderson's "successor" on the case, Detective Adamson. In response to the 
anonymous phone call described above, in which a woman reported a man 
confessing a hit-and-run and then leaving in a pearl white truck with a dent 
in the hood, Detective Adamson noted that the "description of the damage to 
the vehicle d[id] not match the expected damage on the suspect vehicle." R. 
707. But when asked if Lynch's truck had incurred the kind of damage he 
would have expected to see-which, again, consisted of dents in the hood-
Detective Adamson testified in the affirmative. R. 1216. 
Fourth, Deputy Anderson reported that he found three zip ties at the 
scene of the collision. R. 50, 705. He subsequently found a piece of a zip tie 
4 
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fragment in the engine department of Lynch's truck. R. 76-77. A forensic lab 
analyst testified at trial that the zip tie fragment found in the engine 
department matched one of the broken zip ties found at the scene. R. 113. In 
attempting to explain the presence of zip ties at the scene of the crime and in 
the truck's engine department, Deputy Anderson testified that the white 
truck had a "faulty hood" that the zip ties were used to secure. R. 75-76. 
Fifth, the State tried to establish that the paint found on the victim's 
clothing came from Lynch's truck. To do so, they first noted that some 
portions of the truck had been painted with spray paint. R. 102. They then 
hired a paint expert to compare the paint from the truck to the paint found 
on the victim's clothing. R. 754-56. Despite hours of testing, however, the 
paint expert could only conclude that the paint found on the victim's clothing 
vJ was the "same distinct type of paint"· as some of the paint from the truck. R. 
756. At its essence, this conclusion stood for nothing more than that there 
were chemical similarities between the two paints. 
VP Defense counsel did very little to rebut the force of this physical 
evidence. Despite the truck's central place in the determination of Mr. 
Lynch's guilt, defense counsel never examined the truck. R. 453. Counsel 
never tested Deputy Anderson' assertions that the zip ties were necessary to 
secure a faulty hood, that a "tow hook" at the bottom of the truck was 
responsible for the victim's left calf injury, or that the paint from the truck 
and from the victim's clothing shared certain chemical similarities. Making 
matters worse, defense counsel declined to consult with or call a paint expert 
.JJ of their own, and never bothered to follow up with the potential witnesses 
described above. 
5 
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Even after the State's painstaking examination of the truck and 
conducting related tests, the physical evidence connecting Mr. Lynch's truck 
to the collision remained underwhelming. Indeed, some of the State's findings 
were flatly inconsistent with a connection between the truck and the victim's 
death. To begin with, the front grill-which was made of a ''heavy plastic-
type material"-was unscathed, a hard-to-explain occurrence given its 
alleged high-speed collision with a 161-pound woman. R. 1015. In addition, 
given the force of the collision, one would naturally expect the grill's oxidized 
substrate-which came off the grill with the rub of Deputy Anderson's finger, 
R. 1217-to end up on the victim's clothing. But the State's expert report 
contained no such finding. R. 755-56. In addition, the State was unable to 
conclusively identify any individual person's DNA on the truck. R. 109, 711-
13. One of the State's witness expressed surprise regarding the lack of DNA ~ 
evidence on the truck, explaining that, given the extent of the injury to the 
victim's calf, he would have expected to find recoverable DNA on the truck. R. 
112. 
In 2012, two veteran police officers conducted their own examination of 
Lynch's white truck. Their conclusions departed dramatically from the 
testimony of the State's witnesses at trial. According to Agent Steed, he and 
Agent Warren "examined the hood latch." R. 1016. Although Deputy 
Anderson testified at trial that the zip ties were necessary to secure a faulty • 
hood, Agent Steed testified that the hood "appeared to work perfectly for the 
age of the vehicle." R. 1016. The officers' opened and closed the hood several 
times, finding that "there was no evidence of a malfunction." R. 1016. Next, 
the two got down on their "hands and knees" to see whether there was a "tow 
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hook" or "tow ring'' that could be "located on the Truck's front end," but found 
nothing of the sort. R. 1017, 2096:115. Finally, they tried to understand from 
where the zip ties might have fallen off the truck. In response to their inquiry 
regarding zip ties, Deputy Anderson responded: "what zip ties"? R. 1016. 
Deputy Anderson went on to explain that there were "no zip ties found at the 
actual scene," and that the only "zip ties" were used by the "police officers 
themselves while transporting the Truck from its initial location in the 
Evidence Center." R. 1016, 2096:17-18, 37-38. 
Unfortunately for Mr. Lynch, Agents Steed and Warren conducted this 
investigation long after it would have made a difference in his trial. He was 
convicted of his wife's murder on November 14, 2008. 
Statement of Proceedings 
¼I Lynch was convicted of first degree murder and second degree 
obstruction of justice following a trial in 2008. R. 36. At trial, he was 
represented by Monte Sleight and Julie George. Following his conviction, 
Lynch moved for a new trial. At that point, Lynch was represented by Patrick 
Corum. R. 663. In his motion and supporting memorandum, Lynch argued 
that trial counsel was ineffective because she (1) did not share discovery or 
consult with him properly prior to trial, (2) precluded Lynch from presenting 
certain evidence and arguments at trial and advised him not to testify on his 
own behalf, (3) did not follow obvious investigative leads, and (4) failed to 
have important evidence examined or challenged. Id. 
At the hearing on Lynch's motion for new trial, trial counsel-Ms. 
vJ George-was asked regarding some of the decisions she made at trial. In 
response to one such question, she set forth her reasons for declining to 
7 
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further investigate Ashe's report of a hit-and-run in Holladay, Utah. 
According to Ms. George, following up with Ashe did not make sense because 
the "information [wa]s hearsay, and it would not be admissible in court." R. 
455. Ms. George's second concern was that the person making the statement, 
even ifhe could be tracked down, would "take the Fifth Amendment." R. 455. 
As for her reasons for ultimately failing to examine the truck, Ms. 
George failed to identify any. She did testify that she informed the State 
before trial she "wanted to have an opportunity to have [her] investigator go 
out and examine the truck," but admitted that was never done. R. 453. She 
thought her failure had little effect on the trial because the "truck was tested ~ 
prior to trial." R. 454 (emphasis added). Finally, as to her failure to consult a 
defense expert on the topic of paint matching and analysis, counsel said there 
was no need to do so because all necessary information could be found in the 
findings and report of the "State's expert." R. 451. 
The trial court denied Lynch's motion. R. 667-68. Lynch subsequently 
appealed his conviction. His appeal focused on two critical issues: (1) failure 
of the trial court to provide the jury with an instruction regarding Lynch's 
alibi defense, and (2) prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument. R. 
44-47. Because neither issue was preserved below, Lynch pressed these 
arguments based on a theory of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. Lynch's 
appeal was denied. R. 39-4 7. _, 
Following the denial of his appeal, Lynch-proceeding prose-filed for 
relief under the Post-Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"). After securing 
representation, Lynch filed an amended PCRA petition (the same "Second 
8 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Amended Petition" described above) on February 5, 2013. R. 991. The claims 
outlined in that petition are the subject of this appeal. 
The Second Amended Petition raises two primary grounds for relief, 
ineffective assistance of counsel and newly discovered evidence. R. 991-1009. 
~ Many of the facts supporting Lynch's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims 
were not developed, however, as a result of the trial court's summary 
judgment ruling on those claims. R. 17 41-45. Lynch's newly-discovered-
evidence claims were dismissed following an evidentiary hearing. R. 
2096:145. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
For purposes of this appeal, the question is not whether Lynch is 
innocent of the crimes of which he was convicted. The questions, instead, are 
two-fold. First, in his Second Amended Petition, did Lynch present enough 
evidence to warrant a hearing on his claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel? Second, did the newly discovered evidence Lynch presented in his 
Second Amended Petition justify relief under the PCRA? Contrary to the trial 
court's holding, the answer to both questions is yes. 
As to the first question, the trial court initially erred when it held that 
many of Lynch's ineffective-assistance claims were barred by Utah Code 
§ 78B-9-106(1)(b). The Utah Legislature very carefully limited the reach of 
that section to claims "raised or addressed at trial or on appeal." Utah Code 
§ 78B-9-106(1)(b) (emphasis added). To the extent they were raised before he 
initiated post-conviction proceedings, Mr. Lynch's claims were raised in his 
~ motion for a new trial, which does not fall within the terms "at trial" or "on 
appeal." Even if arguments pressed in a motion for a new trial fall within the 
9 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
confines of§ 78B-9-106(1)(b), moreover, the trial court's holding still barred 
far more claims than were "raised or addressed" in the motion for a new trial. ~ 
As to the substance of Lynch's claims, the trial court barely bothered to 
explore them, instead resting on the briefing put forth by the State. R. 1744-
45. But nowhere in the trial court's holding or in the State's briefing will one 
find an adequate explanation for the inadequate performance of Lynch's 
counsel. There is no plausible explanation as to defense counsel's failure to 
examine the alleged murder weapon-the white truck. When it came to 
direct, physical evidence, the State's case was that truck and that truck 
alone: its dimensions, its attributes, its hood, its alleged tow hook, its paint, 
its existence. And yet, although the truck stood in the State's possession, free 
to be examined and potentially reveal exculpatory information, defense 
counsel sat on their heels, satisfied with their ability to review the results of ~ 
the State's examination. The evidence suggests defense counsel fell short in 
other ways-failure to properly investigate the zip ties, failure to consult or 
call a paint expert, failure to hammer home exculpatory facts on cross-
examination, and failure to pursue other investigative leads, including 
potential witnesses-but their failure to examine the State's primary and 
only piece of physical evidence was the epitome of deficient performance. 
In its briefing below, the State largely focused on the prejudice prong of 
Lynch's ineffective-assistance claims, pointing to circumstantial evidence 
that tended to support the conviction. But without much of the physical 
evidence upon which it had relied, the State's circumstantial evidence would 
have substantially diminished in strength. Had counsel properly examined 
and investigated the truck, the jury would have learned that the truck did 
10 
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not actually have a tow hook on it, which, in turn, would have considerably 
weakened the State's explanation for the victim's left-calf injury. The jury 
would have learned that the truck's hood was not actually faulty, which 
would have considerably weakened the State's only explanation for the 
vil presence of the zip ties. Furthermore, both of these revelations would have 
seriously undermined the credibility of the State's primary witness and chief 
investigator. Without this evidence and with Deputy Anderson's credibility 
called into question, the jury might have been willing to consider other 
suspects, including the man involved in a hit-and-run in Holladay. 
Unfortunately, defense counsel also failed to pursue that lead. 
In short, had counsel performed effectively, the jury would have been 
left with Lynch's questionable behavior and paint found on the victim's 
"" clothing that was consistent-not a match, but consistent-with paint from 
the truck. On that record, there is a reasonable probability the jury would 
have decided differently. 
~ Finally, and as to the second question, Lynch's newly discovered 
evidence was sufficient to warrant relief under Utah Code § 78B-9-104(e). 
That evidence showed that the truck did not have a tow hook, that there were 
not zip ties, and that there was no need to store zip ties on the truck because 
its hood worked perfectly well. With this evidence before it, no reasonable 
jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Lynch was guilty of 
murdering his wife. 
11 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
I. 
ARGUMENT 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY GRANTING THE STATE'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON LYNCH'S CLAIMS 
OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 
In the post-conviction context, "summary judgment" is a "drastic 
remedy" that requires "strict compliance with the rules governing summary 
judgment." Kell v. State, 2008 UT 62, CJ[ 48, 194 P .3d 913. Thus, on review of a 
grant of summary judgment on post-conviction review, the Court "affirm[s] a 
grant of summary judgment when the record shows that there is no genuine 
issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law." State v. Ross, 2012 UT 93, CJ[ 18, 293 P.3d 345. "In making this 
assessment," the Court "view[s] the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Id. Stated 
otherwise, "[a]ny showing in support of summary judgment 'must preclude all _, 
reasonable possibility that the loser could, if given a trial, produce evidence 
which would reasonably sustain a judgment in his favor." Archuleta v. 
Galetka, 2011 UT 73, CJ[ 43, 267 P.3d 232. 
A. The District Court Wrongly Held That Utah Code § 78B-9-
106(1)(b) -Which Prohibits a Post-Conviction Petitioner 
From Raising Claims That Were Raised at Trial or on 
Appeal-Barred Several of Lynch's Ineffective-
Assistance-of-Counsel Claims. 
The trial court wrongly concluded that many of Lynch's claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel-including his first, second, third, fourth, 
eleventh, sixteenth, eighteenth, nineteenth, twentieth, twenty-first, twenty-
second, and twenty-third-were procedurally barred under§ 78B-9-106(1)(b) 
of the PCRA. To begin with, § 78B-9-106(1)(b)'s procedural bar extends only • 
to claims raised "at trial" or "on appeal," and therefore does not extend to 
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claims raised in a motion for new trial. In addition, even if§ 78B-9-106(1)(b) 
is not so limited, it applies only to claims that have already been "raised" or 
"addressed," and most if not all of Lynch's ineffective-assistance claims were 
not "raised" or "addressed" in his motion for new trial. 
1. Claims raised in a post-judgment motion for new 
trial do not fall within the purview of Utah Code 
§ 78B-9-106(1)(b), which bars only claims raised "at 
trial" or "on appeal." 
Section 78B-9-106(1)(b) does not bar the presentation of claims on post-
conviction review that may have been raised and presented in a motion for 
new trial. By its terms, § 78B-9-106(1)(b) bars on post-conviction review the 
presentation of claims that have been "raised or addressed at trial or on 
appeal." (emphasis added). Like other statutes, the meaning of the PCRA is 
determined according to the "plain meaning of [its] text." Olsen v. Eagle 
Mountain City, 2011 UT 10, 'II 9, 248 P.3d 465. Here, the PCRA's text is 
unambiguous and unequivocal. "At" is used as a "function word to indicate 
presence in, on, or near." Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 136 (1993) 
(emphasis added). "On," meanwhile, is used as a "function word to indicate 
presence within." Id. at 1574 (emphasis added). Neither preposition is 
"' typically used to more broadly encompass events that do not take place "at" or 
"on" a particular location. One would never say, for example, that a party 
cross-examined three witnesses "at trial" while meaning to say that the 
witnesses were cross-examined in a proceeding after the trial was concluded. 
Consistent with these definitions, the Utah Supreme Court has observed that 
§ 78B-9-106(1)(b) applies to grounds raised "in any previous trial, appeal, or 
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post-conviction proceeding." Taylor v. State, 2012 UT 5, 1[ 22, 270 P.3d 471 
(emphasis added). ~ 
There is good reason to believe, moreover, that the Utah Legislature's 
choice of words was no accident. The PCRA's immediately preceding 
provision bars claims on post-conviction review that "may still be raised . . . 
by a post-trial motion." Utah Code § 78B-9-106(1)(a) (emphasis added). Had 
the Legislature wanted, it could have added "post-trial motion" to subsection 
(b), but it declined to do so. A legislature's decision to include certain 
language in one part of a statute but not in another part suggests the 
addition or (as in this case) omission is purposeful. See Dep't of Homeland 
Sec. v. MacLean, --- U.S. ---, 2015 WL 248560, at *6 (U.S. Jan. 21, 2015) 
("Congress generally acts intentionally when it uses particular language in 
one section of a statute but omits it in another."). This maxim of legislative ilrJ 
meaning applies with particular force where, as here, the reference to "post-
trial motion" and its omission are "in close proximity." Id. 
A similar approach has been adopted in some other states. In 
Pennsylvania, for example, an issue has not been "previously litigated" unless 
"the highest appellate court in which the petitioner could have had review ... 
has ruled on the merits of the issue." 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9544(a)(2) (2015). 
Other states, by contrast, apply a broader procedural bar by preventing the 
introduction of issues on collateral review that have been "previously and 
finally litigated in the proceeding resulting in conviction or in any other 
proceeding that the person has taken to secure relief from the person's 
conviction." Md. Crim. Proc. § 7-102(b)(2) (2015) (emphasis added). The Utah 
Legislature could have borrowed this kind of language from Maryland's or 
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other states' statutes. But it did not do so. By choosing different and more 
precise language, the Utah Legislature limited § 78B-9-106(1)(b)'s procedural 
bar to a narrower universe of claims-those claims raised or addressed "at 
trial" or "on appeal." 
Several good reasons might explain the relatively limited reach of the 
Utah statute. First, the Legislature may have wanted to ensure coordination 
between the scope of§ 78B-9-106(1)(b)'s bar and a criminal defendant's right 
to counsel. Cf. State v. Sharkey, 322 P.3d 325, 329 (Kan. 2014) (explaining 
that a criminal defendant's right to counsel "attaches only to critical stages of 
a felony proceeding," and that the "United States Supreme Court has not 
directly answered the question of whether a hearing on a motion for new trial 
is a critical stage of the proceedings"). Unrepresented criminal defendants or 
defendants with limited representation, the Legislature might have 
surmised, should not be held to the underdeveloped and unsupported legal 
arguments they sometimes make. See Adams v. State, 2005 UT 62, 1[ 23, 123 
~ P.3d 400 (pointing out that "it is nearly impossible for even the most 
conscientious prisoner to discover possibly valid legal claims of error and 
pursue them completely''). Second, the Legislature might have recognized 
that the claims most often raised on post-conviction review involve ineffective 
assistance of counsel or newly discovered evidence, both of which are difficult 
to develop and support in a post-trial motion. See, e.g., Kimmelman v. 
Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 378 (1986) ("[A]n accused will often not realize that 
he has a meritorious ineffectiveness claim until he begins collateral review 
~ proceedings."). 
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Whatever the Legislature's reasons, the fundamental point is this: the 
plain and unambiguous text of the statute limits its procedural bar to claims ~. 
raised "at trial" or "on appeal." If the Legislature wishes to expand the 
statute's reach, it is free to do so, but appellate courts are not in the habit of 
rewriting statutes in pursuit of unstated objectives. See Berrett v. Purser & 
Edwards, 876 P.2d 367, 370 (Utah 1994). There is no good reason for it to 
start now. 
2. Lynch's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims 
should not be barred even if Utah Code § 78B-9-
106(1) (b) applies here, because Lynch did not "raise" 
his post-conviction claims in his motion for new 
trial. 
Even if§ 78B-9-106(1)(b) bars a petitioner from introducing claims on 
post-conviction review that were "raised or addressed" in a post-trial motion, 
the trial court's conclusion that § 78B-9-106(1)(b) bars twelve of Lynch's ~ 
twenty-eight ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims is unsustainable. Few 
Utah cases have interpreted the meaning of the Act's use of the term "raise," 
but it stands to reason that the term would bear the same meaning in the 
post-conviction context as it does in the regular course of appellate procedure. 
Cf. Jennings v. Stephens, 135 S. Ct. 793, 800 (2015) (explaining that, even in 
''habeas cases," the default rule is to "adhere to the usual law of appeals"). 
And under Utah law, to "raise" an issue requires a party to be "specific•" and 
"introduce supporting evidence or relevant legal authority." Brookside Mobile 
Home Park, Ltd. v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, <JI 14, 48 P.3d 968. Under this 
standard, Lynch did not "raise" most of his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel 
claims in his motion for new trial. R. 1620-26. 
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In his motion for new trial, Lynch claimed that his counsel was 
ineffective for four reasons: ( 1) they did not share discovery with him; (2) they 
barred him from presenting certain evidence and arguments at his trial; (3) 
they did not follow obvious investigative leads; and (4) they failed to have 
important evidence examined or challenged. R. 663. Lynch raised neither of 
the first two claims in his Second Amended Petition. As to the latter two 
claims, Lynch argued in his post-trial motion that his counsel "did not consult 
with or hire an expert regarding DNA evidence," did not ''have the truck 
examined by a mechanic to determine its working condition," and did not 
contact the truck's previous owner "to testify as to the truck's poor 
mechanical condition and the extreme difficulty it had on hills." R. 1623-24. 
Lynch raises none of these arguments in his Second Amended Petition. The 
closest he comes is when he contends that his counsel was ineffective because 
she failed to cross-examine and develop the undisputed fact that the victim's 
DNA was not found on the truck, but Lynch does not press that theory of 
ineffective assistance on this appeal. 
To be sure, as the State pointed out below, Lynch hinted at some of his 
other claims during the hearing on his motion for new trial and in 
handwritten letters to the trial court, but nothing said during that hearing or 
in those letters suggests that Lynch "raised" the claims for purposes of 
applying § 78B-9-106(1)(b)'s bar. Perhaps for this reason, the trial court 
lowered that bar. The trial court did not hold that Lynch raised his claims in 
his motion for new trial; instead, the court held that it was enough that the 
~ "essence" of Lynch's post-conviction claims were raised in his motion for new 
trial. R. 17 43. But that is not the law. Taken to its logical end, the trial 
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court's holding would dramatically expand § 78B-9-106(1)(b)'s reach. By the 
trial court's reasoning, § 78B-9-106(1)(b) bars far more than claims "raised or ~ 
addressed at trial or on appeal"; it bars any claim of ineffective assistance, 
newly discovered evidence, or constitutional violation, no matter the topic or 
subject matter to which it applies, as long as the claim's "essence" is later 
raised in a petition for post-conviction relief. Nothing in the statute or the 
case law requires such a draconian result. 
B. Lynch Introduced Sufficient Evidence To Create a 
Genuine Dispute of Material Fact as to Whether Lynch 
Was Deprived of His Sixth Amendment Right to the 
Effective Assistance of Counsel. 
In his Second Amended Petition, Lynch introduced sufficient evidence 
to create a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he was deprived of 
the effective assistance of counsel. The right to counsel "plays a crucial role" 
in our system of justice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984). 
This is because "access to counsel's skill and knowledge is necessary to accord 
defendants the 'ample opportunity to meet the case of the prosecution to 
which they are entitled."' Id. Thus, counsel's role is not to merely be "present 
at trial alongside the accused," but to "provide adequate legal assistance" to 
ensure "just results" and a fair trial. Id. at 686, 685; see Taylor v. State, 2012 
UT 5, <JI 24, 270 P.3d 471 (explaining that, to be considered effective, an 
attorney's performance must be "reasonable" when compared to "prevailing 
professional norms"). In the words of the Utah Supreme Court, the "effective 
assistance of counsel" is one of the "greatest safeguards of individual rights" 
because there is no "adequate substitute ... for a competent and dedicated 
advocate." Adams v. State, 2005 UT 62, <JI 24, 123 P.3d 400. 
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A large part of the dedication required by the Sixth Amendment is an 
advocate's investigation into the facts, the evidence, and the witnesses. 
According to the U.S. Supreme Court: 
It is the duty of the lawyer to conduct a prompt 
investigation of the circumstances of the case and to 
explore all avenues leading to facts relevant to the 
merits of the case and the penalty in the event of 
conviction. 
Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 37 4, 387 (2005). Only after conducting this kind 
of investigation may counsel decide on a particular trial strategy. State v. 
Lenhart, 2011 UT 27, 'JI 28, 262 P.3d 1. This message has been directly and 
consistently delivered by the U.S. Supreme Court, see Kimmelman, 477 U.S. 
at 384 (explaining that the criminal adversarial process "will not function 
properly unless defense counsel has done some investigation into the 
prosecution's case and into various defense strategies"), and the Utah 
Supreme Court, see State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 188 (Utah 1990) ("If 
counsel does not adequately investigate the underlying facts of a case, 
including the availability of prospective defense witnesses, counsel's 
performance cannot fall within the 'wide range of reasonable professional 
assistance."' (emphasis added)). In short, adequately investigating the crime 
with which one's client is charged is the price an attorney pays to receive the 
deference to which precedent says he or she is entitled. If an attorney 
vb conducts a half-hearted or partial investigation, by contrast, his decisions 
receive the respect "to the extent of the investigation [he] in fact conducted." 
Bigelow v. Williams, 367 F.3d 562, 566 (6th Cir. 2004) (Sutton, J.). 
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1. There is a genuine dispute of fact as to whether 
Lynch's trial counsel performed deficiently by failing 
to adequately investigate the facts underlying the 
charged crime. 
Unfortunately, the investigative efforts of defense counsel fell woefully 
short. To see why, one need only consider the nature of the State's case and 
the limited direct evidence it presented to implicate Lynch in the murder of 
his wife. There were no eyewitnesses; there were no ear-witnesses (at least 
that the State bothered to look into). With respect to physical evidence, the ~ 
State's entire case hinged on its ability to connect the white truck found in an 
abandoned garage to the victim's death. As the ensuing discussion 
demonstrates, defense counsel's performance in attempting to combat that 
connection was deficient. 
a. Failure to Examine the Truck 
To begin, Lynch's counsel never examined the white truck. R. 453. 
Counsel did not do so even though the State's case was devoted almost 
exclusively to convincing the jury that the white truck was the murder 
weapon. As relevant here, the State did this in two primary ways. 
First, the State introduced evidence to suggest that a "tow hook" on the 
front of the white truck explained the devastating injury to the victim's left ~ 
calf. R. 1213 (Deputy Anderson pointing to the bottom of a picture presented 
at trial, and testifying: "Down here there is the tow hook," which, he 
explained, was believed to have been "involved with causing the injury to the 
calf .... "); see also R. 778 (Deputy Anderson referring to the tow hook as a 
"steel hook" that "sticks out" and is "attached to the frame"); R. 75; 166 ("The 
injury to the left calf, the major injury, lined up with the tow hook, that is on 
20 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the front of the vehicle."); R. 212 (State's Brief on Appeal: "A tow hook on the 
front of the truck lined up with where [the victim's] left calf had been split 
") open ..... 
Second, the State introduced evidence to suggest that a broken zip tie 
was found in the white truck's engine compartment, and that the zip tie was 
likely used to secure the truck's purportedly faulty hood. R. 75-76. Deputy 
Anderson first introduced this theory when he testified that the zip ties he 
found had taken on a particular "shape," as if they had been "adhered" to 
"something," possibly "in the front of the vehicle." R. 52-53. Soon enough, 
Anderson began positing that the "something'' to which the zip ties were 
"adhered" was the hood of the truck because it was not ''latched down 
correctly'' and it "appeared to be loose." R. 1307; R. 76; R. 66 (Deputy 
vj Anderson: "[T]here was some information that had come forth on this truck 
that potentially could have had a faulty latch for the hood."). The State never 
really described how the zip ties were used to secure the_ hood, but it 
~ remained the State's only explanation for the presence of the zip ties in the 
truck's engine compartment, even while defending the conviction on appeal. 
R. 212 ("[T]he hood of Defendant's truck did not close properly, and officers 
found a zip tie fragment in the engine compartment-suggesting that zip ties 
had been used to secure the hood."). According to the State, the zip tie found 
in the engine compartment was the "one piece" of the case that "really 
clinche[d] it." R. 125. 
Despite the State's unyielding efforts to connect the white truck to the 
~ victim's death, defense counsel never examined the truck, never personally 
saw it, never tested it, and never double-checked the accuracy of the State's 
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examination. R. 453. In failing to take these basic investigative steps, defense 
counsel fell short of "one of criminal defense counsel's most fundamental 
obligations": to "investigate the underlying facts of a case." Lenhart, 2011 UT 
27, <JI 28. To be clear, counsel did not just fail to look into a possible witness, a 
tangential piece of evidence, or some hare-brained theory. Counsel failed to 
examine the State's primary piece of evidence-the only physical evidence 
that directly connected Lynch to the crime. Whatever else is encompassed in 
an attorney's duty to investigate, it at least extends to investigating the 
State's primary-and in some ways only-piece of direct evidence. Cf. 
Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 377 ("[L]ooking at a file the prosecution says it will use 
is a sure bet: whatever may be in that file is going to tell defense counsel 
something about what the prosecution can produce."). By failing to examine 
or even look at the truck, defense counsel performed deficiently. See Honie v. iiJ 
State, 2014 UT 19, <J[ 36. ("[A]n attorney is required to perform any 
investigation competently and thoroughly."). 
Illustrative of the importance of investigating the State's primary piece 
of evidence is this Court's decision in State v. Thompson, 2014 UT App 14, 
<JI 36, 318 P.3d 1221. There, the State introduced evidence in the form of a 
computer report, which purportedly established that the defendant truck 
driver could not have made a particular trip within the time he claimed to 
have made it. Id. Despite the report's central importance to the case, defense ~ 
counsel did not inquire into the report's "foundational issues," did not 
"attempt to contact representatives of the company that produced [the 
report]," and did not "otherwise investigate the program or report." Id. 'JI 18. 
These failures, the Court held, amounted to deficient performance. 
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Below, the State did not seriously attempt to defend counsel's failure to 
examine the truck, instead insisting that "no facts in this record show that 
counsel did not examine the truck or have an expert do so." R. 1564. The 
State's position is not easy to reconcile with defense counsel's testimony: 
A: At that time I contacted the State, indicated 
that I wanted to have an opportunity to have my 
investigator go out and examine the truck. . . . [The 
State] could make arrangements to go out to where 
the truck was being held and test-drive it, and 
examine it specifically. 
Q: And was that ever done? 
No, it was not done. 
R. 453. At the very least, this testimony creates a genuine dispute of material 
fact as to the extent of counsel's investigation below. 
In sum, although defense counsel claimed to have spent "many, many 
hours" with a "private investigator" with some experience in "accident 
reconstruction," R. 448:2-8, counsel's failure to examine the State's primary 
piece of evidence fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Although 
defense counsel's failure to examine the truck is sufficient by itself to render 
counsel's performance deficient, counsel's performance fell short of reasonable 
professional standards in other ways as well. 
b. Failure to Test the State's Theory Regarding the Zip 
Ties 
On October 7, 2003, Deputy Anderson reported that he had found three 
zip ties at the crime scene. R. 705. At trial, the State tried to connect the zip 
ties to the auto-pedestrian collision in two ways. First, the State introduced 
testimony that the zip ties had what appeared to be "white paint" on them. R. 
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50. Second, the State introduced testimony that the zip ties "were in line with 
the collision path," and had fallen in kind of a "consecutive" pattern. R. 51. 
Despite the central importance of the zip ties to the State's case, 
defense counsel never independently examined the zip ties, R. 452, and 
declined to seriously probe the problems associated with them. Counsel did 
not, for example, have the zip ties tested for the presence of paint. Nor did 
counsel independently evaluate how the zip ties were placed on the truck or 
found at the crime scene. Most troubling, defense counsel did not seek (by 
examining the truck) to undermine the State's theory as to the purpose it 
served. In the words of the Utah Supreme Court, one "cannot imagine a 
circumstance in which defense counsel could justify declining to test physical 
evidence that his client reasonably believes could be exculpatory." Lenhart, 
2011 UT 27, 'Il 35. 
C. Failure to Investigate the Paint Found on Victim's 
Clothing or to Consult or Call an Expert for the 
Defense 
Defense counsel also failed to adequately investigate the paint found on 
the victim's clothing. The State's paint expert concluded that two of the 
smears on the victim's pants "originated" from the "same distinct type of 
paint" as the "passenger's side truck bed" or from "another source of paint 
having the same characteristics." R. 102. She further concluded that the 
"multi-layered paint fragments from the [victim's] blue pants" came from the 
same "distinct type of paint" as could be found on the ''hood of the truck." R. 
103. 
Defense counsel cross-examined the paint expert regarding the expert's 
conclusions, including pointing out that the paint was merely "consistent" 
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with the truck's paint but was not a complete match. R. 756. Unfortunately, 
counsel failed to conduct their own investigation into the paint or hire an 
expert. According to Ms. George, counsel did not call a paint expert because 
the needed information would already be presented by the "State's expert." R. 
~ 451. But this argument could be made about any expert in any case. There is 
a reason parties typically hire their own expert. It is not advisable to rely on 
an opposing expert who is paid by the State and likely to make favorable 
findings for the State. 
What is more, without countervailing evidence, the defense was 
incapable of offering a plausible alternative regarding the paint's origins, and 
was left without the necessary ammunition to attack the methods used by the 
State's expert and the conclusions she reached. In addition, an expert could 
have explained the significance of the State's findings. Is all white paint 
"chemically" similar? Is all automotive paint "chemically" similar? How broad 
a universe did the State's expert suggest when she opined that the paint on 
JJ the victim's clothing came from the same "distinct" type of paint as was found 
on the truck?1 Although each of these questions might have presented a 
fruitful avenue to explore, defense counsel declined to do so. 
The other problem with defense counsel's approach to the State's paint 
expert was counsel's failure to press the expert with respect to the absence of 
1 The absence of an alternative explanation for the paint also allowed the 
State to play fast and loose with the expert's conclusions, such as on appeal, 
when the State incorrectly claimed to have proved that "paint from 
Defendant's truck ended up on Patricia's clothing." R. 213. Not so. The State 
proved only that there were general chemical similarities between the paint 
on Lynch's truck and the paint found on the victim's clothing. Consulting an 
expert would have given defense counsel the tools to intelligently respond to 
the State's exaggerated claims as to the origin of the white paint. 
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oxidized material on the victim's clothing. At trial, Deputy Anderson 
explained that the "residue ... used to cover the grill" had "flaked off," and ~ 
that it would come off as "some kind ... of plastic transfer" that was white in 
color. R. 1217. According to Anderson, the oxidized material would come off 
the grill with nothing more than a rub of a glove. R. 1217. The State's paint 
expert confirmed the flaking of the grill in her report, referring to it as "grey 
substrate." R. 785. Given the force of the collision involved, one would 
naturally expect the grill's oxidized substrate-which, again, came off the 
grill with the rub of Deputy Anderson's finger-to end up on the victim's 
clothing. Although the paint expert's report contained no such finding, R. 
755-56, defense counsel never inquired as to this apparent anomaly. 
Below, the State did not specifically defend the reasonableness of 
defense counsel's failure to consult or call a paint expert, but did generally ~ 
point out the risks associated with blindly cross-examining a hostile expert 
witness. R. 1573-77. The State's argument, however, only highlights the 
problems with defense counsel's performance. Had counsel properly examined 
the truck or hired a paint expert for the defense, there would have been no 
need to ''blindly'' cross-examine a hostile witness. Instead, as pointed out 
above, counsel would have been able to tailor their cross-examination to the 
information acquired through investigation and a defense expert. 
d. Failure to Interview or Otherwise Follow Up on 
Critical Witnesses 
Defense counsel also failed to follow up on potential witnesses. An ear-
witness-Maxwell-told investigators that he "heard a loud noise"-like a 
large vehicle hitting a speed bump or a pothole-and that when he "looked 
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toward the road" he saw a "large red truck driving by." R. 145. Deputy 
Adamson admitted at trial that Maxwell thought he heard noises "associated" 
with the incident, but he did not pursue that investigative path further 
because he could not "definitively'' say that what Maxwell heard was a 
~ vehicle hitting the victim. R. 121. Defense counsel cross-examined Deputy 
Anderson regarding the red truck, but without Maxwell's own testimony 
regarding what he saw, defense counsel could do nothing beyond vaguely 
suggesting the testimony's existence. R. 118. 
Ashe called into the police .station on October 6, 2007, to report that she 
overheard a conversation between two males in a local Smith's. R. 148. 
During that conversation, one of the men said he had ''hit a woman in 
Holladay," and that he later "saw on the news the woman had died." R. 148. 
The two men then left the store in "a pearl white pick-up truck" that ''had 
damage on the front end in the center of the hood area,".and a partial license-
plate listing of "758." R. 148. Although this anonymous tip seemed to very 
~ closely align with the available evidence, Detective Adamson declined to 
pursue it further, reasoning that the evidence did not match and that there 
were just too many hits on the partial "758" license plate. R. 148-49. Defense 
counsel's investigation into Ashe's report was nonexistent, and their cross-
examination on the topic was correspondingly brief. With nothing else to go 
on, she could do nothing but confirm that the truck's license plate contained 
the digits 758. R. 1504. 
According to the State below, defense counsel was justified in their 
V:JP complete refusal to follow up with Ashe because Ashe's testimony was 
"inadmissible hearsay," and counsel could "obtain the same information from 
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other witnesses." R. 1559. The State is wrong on both counts. On the hearsay 
front, by investigating the call-in, counsel could have tried to narrow down ~ 
the possible owners of the pearl white pickup truck far more aggressively 
than the State did. R. 707 (giving up on tracking down the truck's· owner 
because a search of partial plates with number "758" had 300 hits in Salt 
Lake County alone). If counsel was unable to locate the witness-making 
him "unavailable" for purposes of testifying-she could have introduced the 
unavailable witness's statements through Ashe under Utah Rule of Evidence 
804(b)(3), which excludes from the definition of hearsay statements that 
might "expose the declarant to civil or criminal liability."2 
There are two additional problems with the State's suggestion that th'.e 
"same information" was available from other witnesses. First, the example 
the State points to belies any suggestion that this was the "same 
information." Detective Adamson testified that Ashe heard a man say that 
''he may have been distracted by an item that fell in his truck and may have 
hit someone." R. 1559 (emphasis added). Ashe's report to the police, by 
contrast, was not nearly so indeterminate. She told the police that the man 
said he "hit a woman in Holladay'' and that he later "saw on the news the 
woman had died." R. 707. 
Even if the testimony had provided the "same information," cross-
examination is no substitute for the firsthand testimony of a witness. Indeed, 
in Kimmelman, the State offered a similar argument, trying "to lift counsel's 
2 To the extent the statement would expose its declarant to criminal liability, 
Rule 804(b)(3)(B) requires "corroborating circumstances." Utah R. Evid. 
804(b)(3)(B). At least one "corroborating circumstance•" was that Ashe 
recorded the conversation she heard in her journal. R. 216. 
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performance back into the realm of professional acceptability'' by pointing to 
counsel's "vigorous cross-examination, attempts to discredit witnesses, and 
effort to establish a different version of the facts." Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 
385-86. The U.S. Supreme Court, however, would not have it. ''Respondent's 
lawyer," the Court observed, "neither investigated, nor made a reasonable 
decision not to investigate, the State's case through discovery." Id. at 385; see 
also Lenhart, 2011 UT 27, 'J['J[ 31-36 (concluding that counsel performed 
deficiently despite asking some pertinent questions on cross-examination). 
The same conclusion is warranted here. 
Counsel's failure to contact or follow up with Maxwell or Ashe fell 
below professional standards of assistance. Cf State v. Charles, 2011 UT App 
291, 'J['J[ 33-35, 263 P.3d 469. Although an attorney's decision as to which 
witnesses to call is usually considered strategic, courts refuse to shield 
counsel's decisions with that label if counsel has not even bothered to talk to 
the potential witness, see State v. Hernandez, 2005 UT App 546, 'J[ 21, 128 
~ P.3d 556, or when it appears that the failure to call the witness was nothing 
more than the result of counsel's "desire to avoid extra work," Eze v. 
Senkowski, 321 F.3d 110, 136 (2d Cir. 2003). As both conditions appear to be 
met here, counsel's failures to contact Maxwell or Ashe can hardly be called 
"strategic." 
e. Cumulative Impact of Deficient Representation 
Even if none of counsel's errors considered on its own was deficient, 
there remains a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the 
cumulative effect of those errors rendered counsel's performance deficient. 
See, e.g., Lindstadt v. Keane, 239 F.3d 191, 199 (2d Cir. 2001) (explaining that 
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a reviewing court faced with a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
should "consider" counsel's alleged "errors in the aggregate"). 
2. There is a genuine dispute of fact as to whether 
Lynch was prejudiced by the deficient performance 
of his trial counsel. 
There is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defense 
counsel's deficient performance prejudiced Lynch because there is a 
reasonable likelihood the outcome would have been different had counsel 
performed effectively. To show prejudice, Lynch must "show 'that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result 
of the proceeding would have been different."' Honie v. State, 2014 UT 19, 
'J[ 33. In making this determination, the Court takes into account how the 
evidentiary and trial record would have changed had defense counsel 
performed effectively. Thus, when considering the "impact of an error," the ~ 
Court considers the "totality of the evidence before the jury." State v. Charles, 
2011 UT App 291, 'J[ 38, 263 P.3d 469. Below, the trial court and the State 
assessed the potential prejudice of each of counsel's individual errors, but the 
question is whether the combined errors prejudiced Lynch. See State v. King, 
2010 UT App 396, 'J[ 35, 248 P.3d 984; see also Goodman v. Bertrand, 467 
F.3d 1022, 1030 (7th Cir. 2006) ("In weighing each error individually, the 
Wisconsin Court of Appeals overlooked a pattern of ineffective assistance and 
unreasonably applied Strickland."). 
Starting with the truck, counsel's examination of it would have 
revealed trial-changing evidence. For one thing, counsel would have learned 
that the truck does not have a tow hook on it. R. 1132 ("On our hands and 4iii 
knees, Agent Warren and I physically checked on and under the Truck's front 
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bumper, but no 'tow hook or tow ring' could be located on the Truck's front 
end."). In doing so, counsel would have been able to substantially discredit 
the State's explanation for the victim's left calf injury. R. 1213. The vehicle 
that collided with the victim had something on its front end that seriously 
damaged the victim's calf, but it turns out that the white truck had no such 
"something." 
For another thing, counsel would have learned that the truck's hood 
was not actually "faulty." At trial, the State offered one explanation and one 
explanation only for the presence of a broken zip tie in the truck's engine 
compartment: the zip ties were used to secure a faulty hood. But according to 
Agent Steed, a former police officer with twenty-four years of experience, the 
hood "work[ed] perfectly for the age of the vehicle," and although it was not 
necessarily "easy'' to get the hood open and shut, "there was no evidence of a 
malfunction." R. 1131. The broken zip tie, according to the State, was the 
"clinch[ing]" piece of evidence in the case. R. 125. A proper examination of the 
~ truck would have allowed defense counsel to seriously discredit the State's 
only explanation for the presence of the "clinch[ing]" piece of evidence. 
~ 
What is more, counsel's investigation would have turned up 
exculpatory evidence in the form of an undamaged grill with different 
dimensions than the marks on the victim's body. As to the lack of damage, 
counsel's investigation would have revealed that the truck's grill did not 
sustain the kind of damage one would expect from a collision that caused a 
161-pound woman to fly forty-three feet through the air. R. 1130, 139. 
~ According to Agent Steed's examination, the "front grill was intact" with no 
evidence that it had "sustained any damage" or ''been broken in any way." R. 
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1130. On the "dimensions" front, examining the truck would have 
demonstrated that the spacing on the grill did not line up with the alleged ~ 
grill marks found on the victim's body. R. 558, 364. 
All of this would have helped undercut the force of the State's physical 
evidence, but perhaps even more importantly, it would have called into 
question the credibility of the State's primary witness and chief investigator: 
Deputy Anderson. It was Deputy Anderson who told the jury that a tow hook 
was responsible for the injury to the victim's left calf, and it was Deputy 
Anderson who testified that the zip ties were necessary to secure the truck's 
faulty hood. As suggested by counsel's cross-examination of Deputy Anderson 
during the evidentiary hearing below, defense counsel would have had a 
golden opportunity to present Deputy Anderson to the jury in a far different 
light: 
Q: And you represented to a jury in this case, in 
front of Judge Himonas, ... you represented that you 
actually saw [the tow hook]. You didn't just say 
maybe or I don't remember. You told the jury there 
was such a steel hook. Isn't that correct? 
A: Okay. 
Q: And if it wasn't there, that would be false 
testimony. Isn't that true? 
A: Well, I don't know. I don't know that it's false 
testimony. I don't know what the questions at trial 
were. So. 
Q: Very well. Thank you. 
R. 2096:99. Undercutting Deputy Anderson's credibility at trial would have 
significantly enhanced the possibility of an acquittal. See Eze, 321 F.3d at 133 
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(finding prejudicial trial counsel's "inexplicabl[e]" failure to "undercut" the 
"credibility'' of the State's primary witness). 
In sum, if counsel had acquired this information in the course of 
preparing for trial, it would have "alter[ed] the entire evidentiary picture," 
~ resulting in a far different version of events presented to the jury. See 
Lenhart, 2011 UT 27, 'Il 38. The jury would have wondered how it was 
possible for the victim to suffer a devastating injury to her left calf without 
anything on the white truck capable of causing such an injury. The jury 
would have wondered why a broken zip tie was found in the engine 
compartment when there was no conceivable need for the zip tie in that part 
~ 
of the truck. The jury would have been confused by the fact that the grill 
marks on the victim's body did not match the truck's grill. The jury would 
~ have questioned the credibility of the investigator who told them differently. 
All of this would have raised reasonable doubts as to the State's theory. 
Counsel's examination of the truck would also have highlighted for the 
~ jury how little direct physical evidence of guilt the State had presented. The 
State tried to connect the truck to the collision, but without the faulty hood, 
the tow hook, and the grill marks, that connection appears far weaker. For 
'.@ 
starters, even though oxidized material was flaking off the grill, there was no 
oxidized material on the victim's clothing. R. 755-56. The grill was made of 
some kind of "heavy plastic," but was not damaged in any way after allegedly 
colliding with a 161-pound woman. R. 1015. Indeed, the white truck had 
suffered little of the damage Deputy Anderson said he would have expected to 
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see, including broken lamps, bending of the "hood or fender," or "breaking of 
plastic pieces."3 R. 699, 73. 
In addition, and on a related note, Lynch's truck did not contain any 
observable traces of the victim's DNA, which, again, one would have expected 
given the severity of the collision. R. 109-11; R. 173-74. The State's own 
expert testified that, given the severity of the injury to the victim's calf, he 
would have expected "a lot of blood and tissue on the vehicle, but there wasn't 
any." R. 112. 
That leaves the paint. The most the State could say on that topic was 
that the paint found on the victim's clothing was "consistent" with paint 
found on Lynch's truck, but that is far from testimony that the paint on the 
victim's clothing definitively and unequivocally came from Lynch's truck. But 
see R. 213 (State's Brief on Appeal: "[P]aint from Defendant's truck ended up 
on Patricia's clothing during the fatal hit-and-run."). What is more, defense 
counsel might have been able to undercut the paint evidence with an expert 
of his or her own. 
With far less direct physical evidence, and the credibility of the State's 
chief investigator seriously undermined, the jury would likely have been 
3 Detective Adamson testified at trial that the white truck had incurred the 
kind of damage he expected to see given the alleged collision involved, 
presumably having in mind the dent in the truck's hood. R. 1216. But a dent 
in the front hood was precisely what Michelle Ashe reported seeing in a white 
truck in Herriman, Utah, after overhearing a conversation about a hit-and-
run in Holladay, Utah. R. 707. Detective Adamson declined to follow up on 
that report because the "description of the damage to the vehicle d[id] not 
match the expected damage on the suspect vehicle." R. 707. Although 
Detective Adamson's different approaches to different dents might have 
called his credibility into question, there is no evidence that trial counsel ever 
asked Detective Adamson to explain this apparent contradiction. 
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willing to listen to the possibility of other suspects, another area in which 
defense counsel fell short. Despite having leads with respect to at least two 
possible suspects, one based on Maxwell's report and one on Ashe's, counsel 
declined to pursue either. Counsel thought it better to address these reports 
through cross-examination. R. 455. But as explained above, cross-
examination is an inadequate substitute for the kind of thorough 
investigation the Sixth Amendment requires. In addition, counsel's further 
investigation into different explanations of the events might well have borne 
fruit. Armed with the same information available to defense counsel, an 
investigator for the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association was able to track 
down Michelle Ashe. R. 215-16. Ashe confirmed to the investigator that she 
provided that information to the police and that she had recorded the 
I,@ experience in her journal. R. 216. 
To be sure, all of this would have still left the State with some 
potentially persuasive circumstantial evidence, but given the requirement 
that the jury must find a criminal defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt, such circumstantial evidence would not have been enough to carry the 
day. See State v. Maestas, 1999 UT 32, <JI 36, 984 P.3d 376 (holding the 
defendant was prejudiced by his counsel's deficient performance because, 
inter alia, "the circumstantial evidence against [the defendant] [wa]s not 
overwhelming or conclusive"). In sum, even if any particular "piece of 
evidence" is not, ''by itself, overwhelmingly suggestive of [Lynch's] innocence," 
when considered together the evidence is enough to "undermine" the Court's 
"confidence in the jury's verdict." State v. Charles, 2011 UT App 291, <JI 37, 
263 P.3d 469. 
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3. Given the disputes of material fact as to whether 
trial counsel performed deficiently, there is a 
genuine dispute of material fact as to whether 
appellate counsel's performance fell short of the 
Sixth Amendment's requirements. 
Appellate counsel made none of these arguments on appeal. Despite 
raising ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims regarding some aspects of 
defense counsel's performance, appellate counsel never pointed to counsel's 
investigative deficiencies. 
Below, the State tried to erect a permanent barrier to the presentation 
of investigation-related ineffective-assistance claims on post-conviction 
review. The State argued that Lynch should be barred from raising his 
ineffective-assistance claims on post-conviction review because trial counsel's 
investigative deficiencies were not "apparent on the record," and appellate 
counsel does not perform deficiently unless grounds for an appealable issue • 
are "apparent on the record." R. 1565. But of course, an attorney's failure to 
explore crucial evidence-whether in the form of physical evidence or 
potential witnesses-will rarely be "apparent on the record." Inaction does 
not lead to record evidence. Under the State's theory, a post-conviction court 
in Utah may never address trial counsel's investigative deficiencies as long as 
those investigative deficiencies were not placed directly before appellate 
counsel. 
The Utah Supreme Court has refused to adopt such a theory. 
Recognizing the avenues afforded by Rule 23B of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, and refusing to impugn a defendant with a silent record as to 
appellate counsel's investigation of the deficiencies in trial counsel's 
investigative efforts, the Court provided this guidance: 
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These are red flags in the trial record that should 
have sparked some investigation by appellate 
counsel. And appellate counsel may have been 
ineffective for either failing to investigate them, or, 
after investigating, failing to bring a claim of 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel. But the record 
does not tell us whether such an investigation was 
conducted or what such an investigation might have 
uncovered. The record is simply silent on that matter. 
Thus, we cannot determine whether appellate 
counsel's failure to raise the trial counsel claim was 
"objectively unreasonable." And we are in no position 
to speculate on these matters in this appeal. Instead, 
it is precisely this confusion - on the disputed, 
genuine issues of whether an investigation occurred 
and on what it might have uncovered - that requires 
remand on the appellate counsel claim. We conclude 
that genuine issues of material fact preclude 
summary judgment on this issue. Accordingly, we 
conclude that the post-conviction court erred in 
granting the State's motion for summary judgment 
on [the defendant's] claim regarding appellate 
counsel, and we remand for further proceedings on 
that claim. 
Ross v. State, 2012 UT 93, <JI 51, 293 P.3d 345. For similar reasons, the Court 
should not fault Lynch for the absence of evidence regarding what his 
appellate counsel did or did not do here, and reverse and remand for an 
~ evidentiary hearing on that very question. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT NEWLY 
DISCOVERED EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO 
DEMONSTRATE THAT NO REASONABLE TRIER OF FACT 
COULD HAVE FOUND LYNCH GUILTY OF THE CHARGED 
OFFENSE. 
The PCRA makes relief available to a post-conviction petitioner when 
newly discovered evidence demonstrates that "no reasonable trier of fact 
could have found petitioner guilty of the offense." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-
37 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
104(e). To qualify for relief under this prov1s1on, a petitioner must 
demonstrate that the newly discovered evidence: (1) is such as could not with ~ 
reasonable diligence have been produced at trial; (2) is not merely 
cumulative; (3) is not being used solely for impeachment purposes; and (4) is 
such as to render a different result probable on retrial. See Julian v. State, 
2002 UT 61, <JI 14, 52 P.3d 1168. In addition, the newly discovered evidence 
must, when viewed with the other evidence in the record, "create a 
reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt." Medel v. State, 2008 UT 32, 
<JI 51, 184 P.3d 1226. 
This standard is satisfied here. The newly discovered evidence is the 
result of the investigation of Lynch's truck performed by two veteran officers. 
During this investigation, Mssrs. Steed and Warren discovered that there 
were not any zip ties on the truck, but that zip ties were merely used to ~ 
secure parts of Lynch's truck in transport once it was obtained for 
examination, and that Lynch's truck did not have a tow hook. This new 
evidence, considered in light of the evidence presented at trial, is sufficient to 
create a reasonable doubt as to Lynch's guilt. 
Mssrs. Steed and Warren examined Lynch's truck a few years after his 
trial. During this investigation, the pair of former police officers discovered, 
for the first time, that zip ties were not present at the crime scene. R. 1016, 
2096:17-18, 37-38. Instead, according to Deputy Anderson, the zip ties were 
used by officers to transport the vehicle to the evidence facility. Id. Deputy 
Anderson's admission is supported by Steed's and Warren's further discovery 
that the hood of Lynch's truck worked "perfectly for the age of the vehicle," 
and that there was no apparent functional use for zip ties on the truck R. 
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1016, 1131, 2096:21-23. Indeed, the State never presented an explanation as 
to why zip ties would be affixed to the truck, R. 2096:94, despite the fact that 
the zip ties were the State's key piece of evidence to connect Lynch's truck to 
the crime scene. R. 125. 
In fulfilling its obligation to assess the credibility of the newly 
discovered evidence, see State v. Loose, 2000 UT 11, <J[ 18, 994 P.2d 1237, the 
trial court found Steed and Warren "credible" and did not doubt that they 
heard Anderson tell them that zip ties were not found at the crime scene. R. 
2096:143. The only thing contradicting these witnesses' credible testimony 
was the testimony of Anderson himself. R. 2096:86-87. Although Anderson 
insisted that he never made any such statement and remained resolute that 
he discovered the zip ties at the crime scene, he had difficulty remembering 
how the zip ties were secured once they were discovered and when they were 
or were not booked in to evidence. R. :2096:66-71. 
Anderson displayed similar uncertainty regarding the presence (or not) 
of a tow hook located at the front of Lynch's truck. R. 2096:97-99. Indeed, 
although Anderson testified that the truck had a tow hook, investigators for 
Lynch and photographs of the truck revealed that no such tow hook was 
present. R. 2096:115, 724-42. 
Considered within the context of the evidence established at trial, the 
evidence discovered in the course of the former police officers' investigation of 
the truck is critical. It eliminates, or at least severely compromises, major 
parts of the State's theory. By the State's own admission, the zip tie evidence 
was the "clinch[ing]" piece of evidence in securing Lynch's conviction. R. 125. 
But the newly discovered evidence suggests that zip ties were not found at 
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the scene and there was no need for them because the hood worked perfectly 
well. Time and again, the State attempted to tie the victim's left-calf injury to ~ 
the truck's tow hook, but the newly discovered evidence establishes that 
there was no such tow hook. By calling into serious question two of the 
State's strongest pieces of evidence, the newly discovered evidence creates 
reasonable doubt as to Lynch's guilt. That reasonable doubt is sufficient to 
award Lynch relief under the PCRA. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, the Court should reverse the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment and subsequent dismissal of Lynch's Second Amended 
Petition. 
DATED this ~ay of January, 2015. 
s~;;;-~ 
MICHAEL W. YOUNG 
ALAN S. MOURITSEN 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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.;, , .. 
In the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, Sqfe orf.tfI.~·-·· 
SHERMAN ALEXANDER LYNCH, 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Petitioner, 
Case No. 110913691 
vs. 
.. 
Hon. Deno G. Himonas 
STATE OF UT~I, 
Respondent. 
I 
'This matter. is before the Courrbn Respondent the State of Utah's (the State) Motion for 
Summary Judgment In the motion,'the State seeks the dismissal of Petitioner Shennan Lynch•s 
remaining claims for relief under Utah's Postconviction Remedies Act (the PCRA), see Utah 
Code Ann.§§ 78B-9-101, et seq. (2013). For the reasons set forth below, I DENY the motion 
with respect to the newly discovered evidence claim, and GRANT the motion with respect to the 
other claims. 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Lynch's wife, Patricia Rothermic, was killed in 2007 when a vehicle struck her from 
behind. Lynch was charged with murdering bis wife and, at the conclusion of a trial in 2009, a 
jury convicted~ on that charge. Following his trial, Lynch filed a post-trial motion for a new 
trial on the grounds that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that newly discovered 
evidence justified holding a new trial. The trial court denied that motion. Lynch then appealed 
his conviction to tlie Utah Court of Appeals, which affirmed Lynch's conviction.1 See State v. 
Lynch, 2011 UT App 1,246 P.3d 525. 
Shortly after the court of appeals affirmed his conviction, Lynch filed a petition for 
postconviction relief in this Court. Through counsel, Lynch subsequently filed two amended 
petitions. In his second amended petition (the Second Amended Petition), Lynch claims that he 
is entitled to relief on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel and newly discovered 
evidence. The State previously filed a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of 
Lynch,s claims. At a hearing on the motion, the Court did not reach the merits ofLynch,s 
claims but denied the motion without prejudice and allowed the state to refile its motion for 
summary judgment.2 
1 Apparently, Lynch did not seek appellate review of the trial court's ruling on his motion for a new tria~ as that 
motion and the issues associated therewith are not discussed in the court of appeals' ruling. Following the court of 
appeals' ruling, Lynch did not pursue further review from the Utah Supreme Cowt. 
2 ln ~ separate but rela~d case, Lynch v. State, Case No. 110913690, Lynch claimed that he was entitled to 
postconviction relief op factual innocence grounds. The Court granted the State's motion for summary judgment 
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ANALYSIS 
In their current motion. the State argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on the 
remaining claims because Lynch cannot prevail on his ineffective assistance of counsel and 
newly discovered evidence claims. "Summary judgment is appropriate 'if the pleadings. 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 
any. show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.,,, Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, 'if 13, 177 P .3d 600 
(quoting Utah R. Civ. P. S6(c)). As the party moving for swumary judgment, the State has the 
burden to "show bpth that there is no material issue of fact and that the [State] is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law." Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT2, ,I 10, 177 P.3d 600. 
Here, Lynch makes no attempt to controvert the State's numbered statement of facts, and 
therefore, I presume that the facts asserted by the State are true.3 See Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(3). 
The State argues that the undisputed facts establish that Lynch's ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims are procedurally barred or fail on the merits, and that his newly discovered evidence claim 
fails on the merits. I address each of these arguments in tum. 
I. The lneffectlve Assistance of Counsel Claims 
Turning first to the ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the State correctly notes that 
under the PCRA, postconviction relief is not available on a ground for relief that has been 
"raised or addressed at trial oron appeal.'"' Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-9-106(1)(b) (2013). A 
petitioner is also barred from asserting relief oil a ground that "could have been but was not 
raised at trial or on-appeal," td § 78B-9-106{l)(c), unless "the failure to raise that ground was 
due to ineffective assistance of counsel," id§ 78B-9-106(3); see alao id (providing that the 
ineffective assistance exception only applies to a claim for relief under subsection -106(l)(c)). 
Thus, under the PCRA, claims that have previously been raised before a trial or appellate court 
are barred, regardless of whether those clailru! are now raised as a part of an ineffective 
assistance of c~unsel claim. In contras!, claims that could have been but were not raised 
previously are barred unless the fail'1fC to raise those claims was attributable to the ineffective 
assistance of counsel. Moreover, before•addressing the merits of a claim for postconviction 
l In his opposition memorandum, Lynch doos object to several of the State's asserted facts on the grounds that the 
facts are vague or unsupported. However, all of the actual facts in the State's memorandum are supported by 
citations to the record that make the source and contextofthe information clear. Therefore, I DENY Lynch's 
objections to the State's asserted facts. I also note that Lynch does provide his own list of undisputed facts in his 
opposition memorandum. Those facts appear largely to be a summary of the allegations contained in the Seeond 
Amended Petition and most of the facts in Lynch's statement ofundisput.ed factS are not supported by a citation to 
the ~cord. Regardless, even considering the facts asserted by Lynch in their entirety, those facts do not change the 
resolution of the issues-currently before tho Court 
4 Lynch argues that because the PCRA uses the phrase "at trial," Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-9-106(1)(b), that bar does 
not apply to matters raised in post-trial motions. I disagree and reject that argument As the State explains in its 
reply memorandum, the phrases "at trial" and "on appeal" in the PCRA Id, do not refer only to the matters raised at 
trial or on appeal. Rather, those phrases are clearly meant to refer broadly to the trial and appellate stages of 
criminal litigation, which includes matters raised in post-trial motions before a trial court. Moreover, the apparent 
purpose of the procedural bars in the PCRA ls-to prevent a petitioner from repeatedly raising the same claims in a 
postconviction proceed_,ing after fust raising,thcm in a trial or appellate court. M the Utah Supreme Court has 
explained, the PCRA is not intended to be a substitute for appellate review, nor is the PCRA intended to give a 
petitioner a proverbial second bite at the apple··and give them a second opportunity to obtain appellate review. See 
Kell v. State, 2008 UT 62, '\113, 194 P.3d 913; C2rterv. Galetlca, 2001 UT 96,114, 44 P.3d 626. 
2 
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relief, a court must first "determine whether that claim is independently precluded under Section 
78B-9-106." Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(b). Accordingly, I begin my analysis of Lynch's ineffective 
assistance of counsel's claims by addressing the question of whether his claims are barred. 
Here, the State argues that several of Lynch's ineffective assistance of counsel claims 
were previously raised and that his remaining ineffective assistance of counsel claims fail on the 
merits. I agree. 
A. Several of Lynch's Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims Are Barred Under 
Subsection -106(1)(b). 
Turning first to the claims already raised, as the State has established, many of Lynch's 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims.have already been raised by Lynch in previous 
proceedings before this court and the court of appeals. These include Lynch's first, second, 
third, fourth, eleventh, sixteenth, eighteenth, nineteenth, twentieth, twenty-first, twenty-second, 
and twenty-third claims for relief. 5 The essence of the grounds underlying each of these claims 
has previously been raised in either Lynch's motion for a new trial or on appeal. Therefore, 
these claims are barred under the PCRA. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-106(1 )(b ). 
B. Lynch,.s Remaining Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims Are Barred and 
Fail as a Matter of Law. 
With respect to the remaining ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the State asserts 
that these claims are barred under subsection-106(l)(c) because those claims could have been 
raised at trial. In doing so, the State also acknowledges that under the PCRA, the procedural bar 
does not apply to subsection-106(1)(c) if the failure to raise those claims was due to ineffective 
assistance of counsel. See id § 7gg_9:.106(3). Consequently, the question of whether those 
claims are barred is necessarily dependent upon a determination of the merits of Lynch's 
remaining ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Given that fact, I address the merits of the 
remaining claims and the procedural bar simultaneously. 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that a criminal 
defendant has the right to have the assistance of counsel. See U.S. Const. Amend. VI. In order 
to ensure that a criminal defendant receives a fair trial, the United States Supreme Court "has 
recognized that the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel." Strickland 
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686·(1984) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, the 
"Constitution entitles a criminal defendant to a fair trial, not a perfect one." Delaware v. Van 
Arsdall, 415 U.S. 673, 681 (1986). Therefore, a party seeking to overturn their conviction on the 
groµnd that they received ineffective assistance of counsel must demonstrate two prongs: "First, 
the defendant must.show that counsel's performance was deficient," and "[s)econd, that the 
deficient performance prejudiced th~ defense." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 
To satisfy the first Strickland prong, a criminal defendant "'must show that counsel's 
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, ... which "is to be determined 
5 The State acknowledges that portions of Lynch's third, fourth, and twenty-first claims for postconviction relief 
may not have been expressly raised previously. While I agree with the State that the essence of these claims was 
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by 'prevailing professional norms,,,, Kell v. State, 2008 UT 62, ,i- 28, 194 P.3d 913 (quoting 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). In evaluating counsel's perfonnance, a court must evaluate that 
p~rfonnance in light of the totality of the circumstances, ''with 'a strong preswnption that 
counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance."' Id · 
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689), Indeed, a criminal defendant bears the burden of 
"overcom[ing] the 'strong presumption.that [his] trial counsel rendered adequate assistance by 
persuading the court that there was no conceivable tactical basis for counsel's actions." State v. 
Clark, 2004 UT 25, ,r 6, 89 P.3d 162 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (second 
alteration in original). 
Similarly, to satisfy the second Strickland prong, a criminal defendant must establish that 
counsel's performance was prejuqicial by "showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to 
deprive the defendant of a fair trial." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Stated another way, a 
"defendant must show that there is a reasonJtble probability that, but for counsel1s wiprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id at 694; accord Kell, 2008 UT 
62, ,i 29. Likewisct, a petitioner like Lynch who claims that "appellate counsel was ineffective in 
failing to raise a cl~ . , . must show that the 'issue [was] obvious from the trial record and ... 
probably would have resulted in reversal on appeal." Kell, 2008 UT 62, 142 (internal quotation 
matks omitted) (alteration and second omission in original). 
In this case, the State has met its burden of demonstrating that Lynch cannot maintain his 
remaining ineffective assistance of counsel claims. With respect to the third, fourth, fifth, sixth, 
seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth, twelfth, tliirteenth, fourteenth, fifteenth, twenty-first, twenty-fourth, 
twenty-fifth, twenty-sixth, twenty-seventh, and twenty-eighth claims, the State has shown that 
Lynch's previous counsel had a conceivable tactical basis or justification for failing to take the 
actions in question. 6 These bases include that that the actions in question would have been futile, 
that the actions may have backfired or been harmful to the defense, that the evidence had already 
been presented by other witnesses, that the actions would have focused on weaker arguments. 
that the available record evidence would not have alerted trial coW1Sel to a potential issue, that 
any error by trial cowisel would not have been obvious to Lynch's appellate counsel, and that a 
challenge to vario~ statements by the prosecution and prosecution witnesses would be futile 
because those statements were accurate. 7 
. In response to the State's argument, Lynch does not separately respond to each of the 
claims discussed in the State's memorandum, nor does he separately address the tactical bases 
identified by the State in connection with.each claim. Rather, Lynch argues that his previous 
counsel should have taken other actions that would have been more effective. In doing so, 
however, Lynch largely fails to provide the Court with any evidence to challenge the State's 
assertions that Lynch's defense coW1Sel had reasonable tactical bases for their failure to take the 
5 I also note that the State has offered evidence to show that at least some of counsel's alleged failures were actually 
performed by counsel, including counsel's cross-examination of witnesses, counsel's investigation of Lynch's 
claims, and counsel's retention ofan investigator with the necessary training to Investigate Lynch's technical claims. 
7 R_.ather than repeating the State's argument with respect to each of those claims separately, I incorporate by 
reference the State's ar&ument on those claims. 
4 
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actions in question.8 Therefore, Lynch has not met his burden on summary judgment of 
presenting any evidence to controvert the State's assertions that previous counsel had tactical 
reasons for failing to take the actions that are the subject of Lynch's petition for postconviction 
relief. Moreover, after reviewing of each of the claims discussed in the State's supporting 
memorandum, I agree with the State that defense counsel had a legitimate reason for failing to 
take each of the actions in question. Consequently, as a matter oflaw, Lynch cannot satisfy the 
first prong of the Strickland test. 
Furthermore, even if Lynch could satisfy the first Strickland prong, he is unable to 
satisfy the prejudice prong for similar reasons. As discussed above and in the State's supporting 
memorandum, many of the actions in question would have been futile and, in any event, the 
resulting evidence was squarely contradicted by the great weight of the other credible evidence 
credible sources. Therefore, as a matter oflaw, Lynch is unable show that if his trial or appellate 
counsel would have taken other action, Lynch would have prevailed at trial or on appeal. 
In accordance with the foregoing, I ORANT the State's motion for summary judgment on 
Lynch's ineffective assistance of counsel claims. 
IL Tlte Newly Discovered Evidence Claim 
Next, the State argues that Lynch's newly discovered evidence claim, see Utah Code 
Ann.§ 78B-9-104(1)(e}, fails as~ matter oflaw. I disagree. 
Under the PCRA. a petitioner see~g postconviction relief on newly discovered evidence 
grounds must show; that · 
newly discovered matefial evidence exists that requires the court to 
vacate the conviction or sentence. because: 
(i) neither the petitioner-nor petitioner's counsel knew of the 
evidence at the time of trial or sentencing or in time to include the 
evidence in any previously filed post-trial motion or post-
conviction proceeding, and the evidence could not have been 
discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence; 
(ii) the material evidence is not merely cumulative of evidence that 
was known; 
8 Lynch does assert that under Utah law. counsel's failure to call a witness is not a legitimate tactic. However, in the 
first case cited by Lynch, it was not the failure to call a witness but counsel's failure to investigate that was deficient. 
See State v. Templin, SOS P.2d 182, 188-89 (Utah 1990). The Utah Supreme Court further emphasized that after a 
sufficlen~ Inquiry or investigation. It may be a reasonable tactic for counsel to refrain ftom calling a witness but such 
a decision may only be:made after undertaking an investigatioh. See id. at 189. The other case cited by Lynch, 
State v. Charles, 2011 UT App 291,263 P.3d 469 is also inapposlte. In that case, defense counsel also failed to 
investigate one potential witness, see id. ,r 34, llnd was unable to call other witnesses because of defense counsel's 
own negligence in secu'ring the testimony, see id. 130. In reversing the defendant's conviction, the court of appeals 
expressly noted that there was no strategic l>r tactical reason for defense counsel's failw-e to investigate and secure 
the testimony of key witnesses. See id ff 30-31. To the contrary, defense counsel intended to call the witnesses but 
failed to take the necessary action to secure their testimony. See id Those facts stand in stark contrast to this case, 
where the State has offered several tactical reasons for the actions of Lynch's counsel and the undisputed evidence 
shows that counsel did undertake an investigation and thoroughly reviewed the case with Lynch. 
s 
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(iii) the material evidence is not merely impeachment evidence; 
and· 
(iv}'vicwed with all the'.other evidence, the newly discovered 
material evidence demonstrates that no reasonable trier of fact 
could have found the petitioner guilty of the offense or subject to 
the sentence received. 
Id. The evidence in question· must demonstrate that there is more than "a mere possibility that an 
item of undisclosed information might have helped the defense or might have affected the 
outcome of the trial," Medel v. State, 2008 UT 32. ,i 50, 184 P .3d 1226 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Instead, the newly discqvered evidence. when viewed with the other evidence in the 
record, must "create a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt." /d. iJ 51; cf Brown v. State, 
2013 UT 42, ,i 45,308 P.3d 486 (holding that a factual innocence claim based on newly 
discovered evidence under the PCRA "allows a court to base its determination of factual 
innocence on all a".ailable evidence-both old and new"). 
In this case, the State first argues that the newly discovered evidence-two affidavits 
from investigators· who examined the truck and overheard Detective Anderson-does not meet 
the PCRA's newly.discovered evidence standard because the information regarding the condition 
of the truck could Have been discovered by the investigators and experts that were utilized by 
Lynch's trial counsel. See Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-9-104(f)(l). However, the State does not 
make any argument regarding Lynch's ability to obtain the other information contained in the 
affidavits, including the statement that the investigators heard Detective Anderson state that no 
zip ties were found at the scene of the accident where Lynch's wife was killed. Therefore, in the 
absence of any evidence to the contrary, I cannot say that Lynch could have learned of Detective 
Anderson's alleged statement at an earlier time. 
Furthermor~. viewing Detective Anderson's alleged statement with the other evidence in 
the record and in the light most favorable to Lynch, as I must, see Orvis, 2008 UT 2, '1 6, that 
evidence is clearly material. Indeed, the presence (or lack thereof) of the zip ties at the scene and 
the related questions of whether the hood of Lynch's truck could latch and the damage to the 
truck were key pieces of evidence that the State relied on to demonstrate that Lynch's truck was 
the truck that actually struck ru1d killed the victim. Moreover, as Lynch notes, there is evidence 
that Detective Anderson delayed booking the ·zip ties as evidence, which would also support 
Lynch's claim that ~e zip ties were not' found at the scene of the accident. Thus, assuming that 
all of the statements in the affidavits' are true, the newly discovered evidence would clearly be 
material and could create a reasonable doubt regarding Lynch's guilt.9 In light of those facts, I 
DENY the State's motion for summary judgment with respect to Lynch's newly discovered 
evidence claim. 
9 The State notes that some of the allegations in the affidavits is controverted by other statements by witnesses at 
trial. However, on summary judgment, a trial court may not weigh evidence, assess credibility, or otherwise resolve 
disputed issues of fact. See Webster v. Sill, 615 P.2d I 170, 1172 {Utah 1983); Kilpatrickv. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 
909 P.2d 1283, 1292 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). Therefore, it would clearly be inappropriate for me to weigh the new 
evidence or judge the c,redibility of the affiants' statements at this stage of the proceeding. Instead, as explained 
above, I must accept those statements as true and view the facts in the light most favorable to Lynch. See Orvis, 
2008 UT 2, t 6. 
6 
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CONCLUSION 
In sum, the claims Lynch has previously asserted before this Court and the appellate 
court are barred under the PCRA.. Lynch's remaining ineffective assistance of counsel claims 
also fail on the merits because defense counsel had legitimate tactical reasons for their actions 
and Lynch is unable to establish that counsel's actions were prejudicial. Therefore, I GRANT 
the State's motion for summary judgment with respect to Lynch's ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims. 
There is nothing before me to suggest that Lynch would have been able to discover 
Detective Anderson• s statements regarding the zip ties at an earlier time. When viewed in the 
light most favorable to Lynch, along with the other new and existing evidence, that evidence is 
material. Therefore, I DENY the State's motion for swnmary judgment with respect to Lynch's 
newly discovered evidence claim. 10 
DATED this Jlf da:t of January, 2014 
10 In the memorandum supporting the motion for summary judgment. the State also seeks dismissal of Lynch's 
claims that are predicated on a new rule, see Utah Code Ann. § 7813-9-104(f) (2013) (allowing a petitioner to seek 
postconvlction relief wliere the appellate courts announce a new rule that would entitle a petitioner to postconviction 
reliet) announced by the Utah Supreme Court in Greggv. State, 2012 UT 32, 279 P .3d 396. Lynch does not respond 
to the State's argument that the supreme court did not actually announce a new rule in Gregg, and there is nothing in 
the Gregg decision that appears to be a new rule. Therefore, to the extent that Lynch seeks relief on the newly 
announced rule provision, I agree with the State that Lynch's claim fails as a matter of law and I GRANT summary 
judgment on that claim for relief. 
7 
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Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing 5/1/2014 
credibility of Detective Anderson and of their entire case and 
of the booking process and so forth and, for those reasons, I 
request that our motion be granted. 
THE COURT: Thank you. It is, I think, clear that the 
standard, here, as to the Court, you must est~blish, by\ 
preponderance of the evidence, that the newly-discovered 
evidence, when viewed with the existing evidence, would lead--no 
reasonable trier of fact would be able to find Mr. Lynch guilty. 
We are miles and miles away from that. I deny the motion and 
let me indicate why. 
The newly-discovered evidence, in this particular case, 
was sworn testimony that one of the leader, lead investigator 
for the beginning, and a lead witness in the matter, perjured 
himself at trial and, in fact, that the evidence was notthe 
zip-ties were not found at the scene. I believelook at the 
specific quotation. Something to the effect of zip-ties. What, 
I •• 
zip-ties? ·Those weren't found at the scene. 
Leaving aside Detective Steedor, Officer Steed's inability 
to specifically tie it to Mr. Anderson, Detective Anderson, 
let's assume that that's the case. Along with the other 
testimony, it would mean that all of the objective evidence, the 
photographs that were taken, were false. 
This is beyondit's beyond dispute that the zip-ties, that 
evidence, was observed in situ, by Detective Anderson and others 
and photographed that day and, then, taken into evidence, into a 
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Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing 5/1/2014 
secure facility and, then, ultimately, to the evidence building. 
The petitioner would have the Court believe that Detect ive 
Anderson carries with himdon't forget thatthat, while on the 
scene, Detective Anderson, in the presence of others, who knew 
nothing at the time of Mr. Lynch; truck, or anything el se, had 
planted the zip-ties and , then , apparently, 1ater, clipped a 
portion of the zip-tie to place in another vehicle. We ll , 
forget the fact that that's completely; inconsistent with what 
the alleged newly- d i scovered evidence is . 
evidence is that they weren't at ~he scene. 




This is, kind of, a moving target. It ' s , now , become that l 
the evidence was planted and, thenbut this is theory with 
nothing,' whatsoever , to back it up and I can only assume was in 
light of the overwhelming evidence, the objective evidence that, 
in fact, they were discovered at the scene . The petitioner is 
forced to do the best he can with that . 
Pet'itioner would also have the Court believe that this 
detective, knowing that these individuals were, in fact, 
representatives of Mr. Lynch and had no relationship with them, 
openly admitted t o committing a majo r felony . I t defies common 
sense . 
Whether, frankly , there is sufficient evidence that the 
hood was not latching p rope rly, that the hood was opening , the 
witness saw the hood blow open and more than a reasonable basis 
to befflieve the zip-ties were used to tie-down the hood, but I 
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Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing 5/1/2014 
think Mr. Tenney is right. Who cares? It doesn't matter 
whether or not the hood was tied down. 
I, frankly, found Officer Steed! found everybody quite 
credible. I don't doubt that Officer Steed and the others, 
whatever they thought they heard, they heard. I don't think 
anybody is shading the truth. What actually was said, I don't 
know. It's impossible to believe that Detective Anderson said 
he was the first one on the scene. It's so easily disproven. 
Impossible to believe that they told him the truck was removed 
from the scene. Everybody knows that wasn't the case and, you 
know, it's not just a couple of minor words here that's 
important and! very importantly, right? 
It's why would he tell an individual that those zip-ties 
didn't exist at the time, knowing that there was photographs 
that placed him ther~, aside from the lack of motive. It, 
simply, defies logic in any way, shape or form and, frankly, I 
found the Detective credible on this point. 
The question about the tow hook or the chain not being 
broken, I think the chain was fine. I don't have any problem 
with it going into a secure facility and, then, ultimately going 
into evidence. I have no indication the chain was actually 
broken and the tow hook kind of thing suffers from the same kind 
of problems. 
The truck is there. The Detective knows, even at the 
time, (f:hat it's available for inspection. Mr. Lynch would have 
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Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing 5/1/2014 
the Court believe that, despite knowing that they could bring it 
in, or the Court could go out and see it, that somebody is 
fabricating their testimony about an obviously objective piece 
of evidence. 
Now, you know, is the tow hook meant to describlan 
attachment to which a hook could apply or was the word used 
inappropriately? I don't know, but it doesn't come close to 
suggesting perjury or lack of credibility and the fact I found 
the Detective to be eminently credible, but I don't want to 
suggest, by that! want to be very careful about this, that I 
didn't find the other witnesses, as well. I didn't have any 
sense, frankly, that Mr. Lynch's witnesses were lying. 
I thought Mr. Steed, in particular, was quite credible. 
Unfortunately, people mishear things and it would beif there was 
any untruth that was said at the time, it would be that the_y 
were, in fact, found at the scene, ,but were pulling Mr. Steed's 
leg, if anything was said. Why somebody would do that, I don't 
know, but it's the overwhelming objective evidence. It's just 
that, overwhelming and objective, of where those zip-ties were 
and viewed in light of the additional evidence as well, the 
motive, all of the specific reasons that I remember. 
Frankly, this is a trial that isl remember. I mean, it's 
not lost on me and I've heard various motions, over the years. 
I don't--this is not one in which I believe that, when viewed in, 
the context of all the evidencefrankly, I don't buy the 
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Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing 5/1/2014 
newly-discovered evidence at this point. I think it's clear, 
based on what I've said there, it's, you knowI don't know what 
was said, but there was no perjury and there's no indication 
that it was planted and there's absolutely no evidence, 
whatsoever, in this reco~d to suggest that these detectives took 
the evidence to what they thought was a hit and run, that they 
carry it with them so that they can plant it at a scene and use 
it later to plant on some other piece of evidence is, frankly, 
there's not a shred of evidence, in this record, that that's 
what occurred and, frankly, it's irrelevant because that's 
nothing but theory. It has nothing to do with the 
newly-discovered evidence in this particular case. 
For all of those reasons and, frankly, more, this petition 
is denied in its entirety. I don't believe that writings are 
necessary. I believe that the Court's recitation, on the 
record, of its findings is appropriate. Thank you. 
MR. AUSTIN: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Thank you both. The exhibits. 
Make sure that you gather the exhibits and, Mr. Austin, I think 
you did a fine job. 
MR. AUSTIN: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: I think you did aboth you and Mr. Tenney--
[End of audio recording.) 
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ADDENDUMB 
U.S. Const. amend. li1 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and 
district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which 
district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
assistance of counsel for his defense. 
U.S. Const. amend. XIV (relevant portions) 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject 
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of 
the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any 
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of 
the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Utah Code§ 78B-9-104 
(1) Unless precluded by Section 78B-9-106 or 78B-9-107, a person 
who has been convicted and sentenced for a criminal offense may 
file an action in the district court of original jurisdiction for post· 
conviction relief to vacate or modify the conviction or sentence 
upon the following grounds: 
(a) the conviction was obtained or the sentence was imposed in 
violation of the United States Constitution or Utah Constitution; 
(b) the conviction was obtained or the sentence was imposed 
under a statute that is in violation of the United States 
Constitution or Utah Constitution, or the conduct for which the 
petitioner was prosecuted is constitutionally protected; 
(c) the sentence was imposed or probation was revoked 1n 
violation of the controlling statutory provisions; 
4850-0872-0929. I 
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(d) the petitioner had ineffective assistance of counsel in violation 
of the United States Constitution or Utah Constitution; 
(e) newly discovered material evidence exists that requires the 
court to vacate the conviction or sentence, because: 
(i) neither the petitioner nor petitioner's counsel knew of the 
evidence at the time of trial or sentencing or in time to include 
the evidence in any previously filed post-trial motion or post-
conviction proceeding, and the evidence could not have been 
discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence; 
(ii) the material evidence is not merely cumulative of evidence 
that was known; 
(iii) the material evidence is not merely impeachment evidence; 
and 
(iv) viewed with all the other evidence, the newly discovered 
material evidence demonstrates that no reasonable trier of fact 
could have found the petitioner guilty of the offense or subject to 
the sentence received; or 
(f) the petitioner can prove entitlement to relief under a rule 
announced by the United States Supreme Court, the Utah 
Supreme Court, or the Utah Court of Appeals after conviction 
and sentence became final on direct appeal, and that: 
(i) the rule was dictated by precedent existing at the time the 
petitioner's conviction or sentence became final; or 
(ii) the rule decriminalizes the conduct that comprises the 
elements of the crime for which the petitioner was convicted. 
(2) The court may not grant relief from a conviction or sentence 
unless the petitioner establishes that there would be a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable outcome in light of the facts proved 
in the post-conviction proceeding, viewed with the evidence and 
facts introduced at trial or during sentencing. 
(3) The court may not grant relief from a conviction based on a 
claim that the petitioner is innocent of the crime for which 
convicted except as provided in Title 78B, Chapter 9, Part 3, 
2 
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Postconviction Testing of DNA, or Part 4, Postconviction 
Determination of Factual Innocence. Claims under Part 3 or Part 
4 of this chapter may not be filed as part of a petition under this 
part, but shall be filed separately and in conformity with the 
provisions of Part 3 or Part 4. 
Utah Code 78B-9-106 
(1) A person is not eligible for relief under this chapter upon any 
ground that: 
(a) may still be raised on direct appeal or by a post-trial motion; 
(b) was raised or addressed at trial or on appeal; 
(c) could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal; 
(d) was raised or addressed in any previous request for post-
conviction relief or could have been, but was not, raised in a 
previous request for post-conviction relie£ or 
(e) is barred by the limitation period established in Section 78B-
9-107. 
(2)(a) The state may raise any of the procedural bars or time bar 
at any time, including during the state's appeal from an order 
granting post-conviction relief, unless the court determines that 
the state should have raised the time bar or procedural bar at an 
earlier time. 
(b) Any court may raise a procedural bar or time bar on its own 
motion, provided that it gives the parties notice and an 
opportunity to be heard. 
(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (l)(c), a person may be eligible 
for relief on a basis that the ground could have been but was not 
raised at trial or on appeal, if the failure to raise that ground was 
due to ineffective assistance of counsel. 
(4) This section authorizes a merits review only to the extent 
required to address the exception set forth in Subsection (3). 
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